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Ancient Law and Indian Rights: An Historical Perspective From the
Argentine Chaco,

By Edgar Krebs, NMNH, Smithsonian Institution, and Jose Braunstein,
CONICET, Argentina.
Sans doute les phenomenes juridiques ont-ils voyage, comme tous les autres
elements de civilisation, mals d'une man/ere dlfferente : lis voyagent par sauts.
--Marcel Mauss, Manuel d' Ethnographle. 2
While doing fieldwork in southern Madagascar, one of us--an E.O. Wilson book
on biodiversity In hand--asked a Tatslmo farmer to give the names of the different
species of chameleons in the land. Madagascar is, in the parlance of
conservationists, a "biodiversity hotspot," and the place on earth with the largest
number of species of chameleons. Not for the Tatsimo farmer. 3 He recognized
just one archetypical chameleon. Its different shapes were attributes of the
negative, shifty, social--not biological--place this creature has in the Tatsimo
imagination. Needless to say the concepts "nature," "environment," and
"biodiversity" have no equivalent Malagasy terms. They had to be imported into
the local lexicon. This conceptual variance--indicative of larger differences of
sense and sensibility--is not, of course, a phenomenon exclusive to Madagascar.
In legal terms, the definition of what constituted a tree exercised the Roman jurist
Ulpian, who died in 228 AD. He stated that most of the ancients considered vines
to be trees, as were ivies, reeds and willows. These plants were trees if they
could be uprooted and then transplanted. The stock of an olive was also a tree,
whether or not it yet had roots. As Jill Harrries, explains: "[Uipian's] discussion of
what a tree was is extracted from a work, not on arboriculture, but on detailed
matters of law. Its object was to ascertain when, or in what circumstances an
action for the secret felling of tress could be brought." 4
In Madagascar, the placement of chameleons in whatever taxonomic order
devolves Into a matter of law. To protect a species conservationists need to
argue for its uniqueness, or for the fragility of the environment that sustains it.
From a Tatsimo perspective the ultimate act of colonial occupation is the nature
reserve. The land, which was first planted, dug, and otherwise exploited for
extraction of raw materials, should now remain untouched, yet managed by
others.
What is ultimately at stake in all these attempts at establishing boundaries and
definitions is the kind of relationships people have with objects, entities and other
people, as well as the recognized rights and obligations that derive from these.
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At the very beginning of the deliberations of the ancient Justinian Institutes,
justice is defined ..as an unswerving determination to acknowledge all men's
rights. 115 The Institutes were imperial instruments, and conflicts of interpretation on
issues of property, kinship, divinity and others were matters for constant
negotiation.
There is a resemblance and continuity in subject matter between these classical
antecedents and ancient law and Indian rights. In borrowing the title of our paper
from Henry Sumner Maine's famous book, 8 we intend to draw attention to these
resemblances, and to the considerable intellectual, political and practical
problems they present. Ancient law here stands for the set of practices and
regulations--orally transmitted, customary--of the Indians of the Argentine Chaco,
and Indian Rights, for the rights assigned to them, and other Indians of Argentina,
by the nation-state in the reformed constitution of 1994. It is often overlooked that
these two sets of norms and universes are separate and not necessarily in
communication.
We will briefly outline three areas of inquiry that are particularly relevant to our
research.
One. Indian Rights in the Argentine Constitution

In 1994 the Argentine constitution was modified, ostensibly to allow for thereelection of then incumbent president, Carlos Menem. Yet, the lawyers and
politicians convened to work on the new text were lobbied by NGOs sympathetic
to Indian causes--mainly Catholic groups--and consequently an article on 11 1ndian
Rights .. was added to it: number 75/17. The scope and content of this guiding
legislative framework owes much to jurisprudence established through three
landmark cases presented to the US Supreme Court in the first half of the 19th
century: Johnson v. Mcintosh (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) and
Worcester v. Georgia (1832). What these cases have in common is that the
opinions were written by Chief Justice John Marshall, and that they involve
contested claims of sovereignty, land title and key arguments about what the
jurists call dominium, a dense and history-rich concept, also debated by
theologians and philosophers. It is by asserting dominium that a people ultimately
exercise their sovereign right to their individual freedoms and to self-government.
This is a very complicated subject, which requires careful elucidation. We will
only offer here a view of the landscape from afar.
Justice Marshall's influential legacy--in the United States and elsewhere--is an
ambiguous and paradoxical one. And that is primarily
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because in Johnson v. Mcintosh he brought into American jurisprudence an old
Spanish notion, that of 11the right of discovery," which was always problematic in
British legal tradition. As Marshall explained in his 33-page ruling, "the right of
discovery" was established by Pope Alexander the Sixth in a bull issued in 1493;
it had "the purpose of overthrowing heathenism, and propagating the Catholic
religion ... granting to the crown of Castile the whole of the immense territory
then discovered, or to be discovered, between the poles, so far as it was not then
possessed by any Christian prince." It provided legal justification to U.S. claims of
dominion over Indian lands, a prerequisite for the "Indian Removal Act,"
promulgated in 1830. 7
Even Spanish jurists and theologians found the .. right of discovery.. problematic
because of its obvious Implications for the right to govern over the non-European
occupants of the discovered lands, and the right to claim sovereignty over those
lands. For self-interested reasons, the British chose to implement a different
policy towards America, one based on trade, negotiation of treaties with local
inhabitants, and purchase of land. Differences between British and Spanish
policies were clear and widely known. Remember that when Robinson Crusoe
considered his fate as a castaway on an island, he wondered whether he should
kill the Caribs who inhabited It-should he encounter them. He decided he should
not. Defoe made his hero say proudly that killing the cannibals .. would justify the
Conduct of the Spaniards in all their Barbarities practiced in America ... a
By analyzing the .. right of discovery.. premise, Spanish theologians and jurists of
the School of Salamanca, and later the Dominican Friar Bartolome de las Casas
had chipped away at the notion that Indians were merely occupying
lands over which they could claim no dominion. They were human, they were
organized in communities, they were not really children with deferred rights; and
even if they were sinners, it was up to God, not a temporal ruler, to redeem and
absolve them. As Anthony Pagden put it, 11 if the consequences of these
arguments were to be taken seriously, the Spaniards had to withdraw from
America and return to the Indians all that they had taken from them ... The rights
that the crown now had in the Indies were similar not to those It had over the
people of Castile but to those it had in Milan. The Indian chieftains, like the Dukes
of Milan, ruled over polities that were, in all respects, 'perfect republics', and their
subjects were consequently free men with full dominium under their own laws ... g
The realities on the ground were very different. The Spanish colonists, who at
one point feared that their king would desert them, did not abide by the lofty
dictates of the theologians. The society that had produced all
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of them was the result of eight centuries of religious and military warfare against
the Moors. As Luis Weckmann demonstrated in his classic The Medieval
Heritage of Mexico, it carried to the New World and its peoples the values, rituals
and perceptions of the Other developed during that long confrontatlon. 10 It was
also a society that had experienced intense metlssage, biological and cultural.''
And the Spanish theologians, as important and influential as their normative
prescriptions were, did not have America and its inhabitants primarily In mind
when they made their sophisticated arguments. They were concerned about
saving the soul of the Catholic monarch, Charles V. They were thinking of Wycliff
in Britain as well as Martin Luther and John Calvin in Europe, and what these
agents of the Reformation had to say about sovereignty and the role of religion in
private and public affairs. '2
A British civil war, which was also a religious war, prompted the emigration of the
Pilgrims to America. The mind-set and legal outlook that they carried with them,
as well as their social demographics, were very different from those of the
Spaniards. These differences had consequences for the kind of societies that
emerged. We come now to another complicated subject--comparative social
history--which cannot be dealt with properly here. For the sake of our argument
we will venture to say that, in broad terms, the Spanish experiment was one of
inclusion through metissage and the British-American experiment one of
exclusion through separation.
Marshall's rulings in the Cherokee cases testify to this last trend. He was a
cousin of Thomas Jefferson, and, like him, a supporter of the American
Colonization Society, whose mission was to send African-Americans back to
Africa--thus eliminating the problem of miscegenation. In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, Marshall, borrowing from the juridical arguments of imperial reach that
the Spaniards had discarded, denied the Cherokees the full exercise of their
rights as a sovereign nation. "It may well be doubted," he wrote, ..whether those
tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can,
with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations ... they may, more
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic, dependent nations." 13
There are many paradoxical features of Marshall's rulings. Some of these have to
do with their odd place in British and American jurisprudence. When it comes to
the influence they had on article 75/17 of the reformed Argentine constitution, the
paradoxes are quite stark. Previously, Argentine law on Indian rights was broadly
consistent with the Spanish notion that Indians were no different from the
Milanese or the French: the
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Spanish sovereign--subsequently the Argentine nation--had recourse to no sound
legal arguments to claim dominium over their lives and lands, only allegiance.
There was, to put It mildly, a convenient fog of ambiguity about this principle and
the Realpolitik shrouding it. But there was no ambiguity in the Argentine
Congress when in the 1880s it debated the question of whether to follow the
American example, and legislate the creation of ..domestic, dependent nations 11
within its territory. The thoroughly argued decision was not to do so. Article 75/17,
in the 1994 constitution is, of course, a complete reversal of that decision. 14
This is only a schematic summation of a very complex subject, absorbing as
intellectual history as well as of clear, present, moral and practical consequence
for the Indians of Argentina. Whether we think of Father Vitoria and the School of
Salamanca, Wycliff, Calvin or Justice Marshall, It is also clear that the debate on
Indian Rights has been a European/North American/Latin American affair, carried
out, in the most part, without the input of Indians, and with little consideration for
customary law .15
Two. Customary Law in the Chaco: A Sense of the Terrain

Marcel Mauss observed, with his usual perception,
Law comprises the whole of customs and laws; as such, it forms the
framework for society, it is 'the precipitate of a people' (Portalis). What
defines a group of people is neither its religion nor its technology; it is quite
simply its law. All the other phenomena including religious ones--no matter
what is said about national religions--can stretch beyond the confines of a
given society. But what defines us cannot reach beyond our frontiers.
Thus the phenomenon of law is what gives a society its specificity, its
armature. No doubt jural phenomena have traveled, just like the other
elements of civilization, but in a different way: they travel by leaps. "16
This is important to bear in mind when considering the differences between
the problems of reconciling the two.
customary law and Indian
Traditionally in Argentina, Indians have been considered as a block, as a unity,
set in opposition to the whites. Of course that block is in reality a kaleidoscope,
and the two categories are convenient fictions. The first problem in the task of
assigning rights to the distinct and multiple Indian cultures of Argentina is to
establish the boundaries of each, and the normative systems under which they
operate. This demands an enormous work of translation, analysis and
interpretation. In oral cultures this requires, moreover, to listen
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accurately--which is not an easy proposition--and then convert discourse into
text.
Marcel Mauss highlighted the complexity and challenge of the enterprise when
he pointed out that
Law can further be characterized by its intimacy and by the widely-felt
sentiments of community that accompany it. Throughout the Roman
Empire only the position of the c/vis romanus (Roman citizen) was
guaranteed; everyone else was subject only to the ius gentium, which
means that they relied on the emperor's lndulgence. 17
The intimacy of alien law forms does not readily yield itself to an outsider. All
remedial Instruments of ius gentium, externally Imposed, are problematic and
sometimes very costly surrogates. The concept of ius gentium, the laws of
peoples, has undergone several avatars in history; and its relationship with
customary law and, more broadly, human rights are extremely pertinent to this
discussion, and have generated an ever-growing body of literature, from authors
as diverse as John Rawls in the U.S. and Giorgio Agamben in ltaly. 18 But we
cannot explore any of this here.
Let us look at some ethnographic examples of customary law in the Argentine
Chaco:
-Atilio Caballero, a Pilaga Indian from Pozo Molina, province of Formosa, was
murdered by a white neighbor. At issue was a case of land tenure, made possible
by the passing of law #426, labeled "For the Protection of the Aborigines."
Relatives of the dead man converged on the place of the murder from all over the
province. Among them was a paramount Pilaga leader and relative of the
deceased, DesaRai'n, who was an important evangelical pastor. What Pilaga
customary law demanded was blood revenge; the killer had to pay with his life.
Several attempts were made by Braunstein, and others, to stop this from
happening, and eventually the case was taken over by "the justice of the white
people." The culprit was jailed but later released. More than a year later,
DesaRal'n visited Braunstein in his house, together with twenty other Pilaga
leaders, to seek his help in severing the ties of all the Pllaga with the Evangelical
United Church of the province. They blamed the church for the death of Atllio
Caballero. This was not the result of an error in logic: the Pilaga delegate
procedures of defense to their leaders, formerly warriors proven in battle. Now
some of these traditional roles of leadership have been functionally replaced by
the hierarchies of the native church, and they were blamed for the failure in
obtaining just retribution. There is longer a Pilaga Evangelical United Church in
Formosa.
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-In 1975 Braunstein visited the Anglican mission in Formosa. The wife of the
missionary, R.L., was alone with her children, and scared. A Wichi Indian from
Pozo Yacare, a convicted murderer, had been liberated and had come to the
mission seeking refuge. The mission had advocated on his behalf at the time of
the murder. Braunstein talked to the man over the course of two days trying to
convince him to return home. But he would not. He knew that he was guilty, and
that he was not going to be able to sidestep the revenge of the relatives of the
man he had killed. Therefore, his return was the equivalent of suicide for him.
The concept of guilt among the Wichi follows a clear, formal notion. The entire
process is seen as a road that has a beginning, a middle, and an end. This man
affirmed that the event he had set in motion was lacking its ending, which was
obviously foretold.
-In 1973, Braunstein met an old Wichi man who had participated in the Chaco
War of 1932-34 between Bolivia and Paraguay. The Bolivian troops had forcefully
enlisted him while he was on a hunting expedition In the bush. After the war, he
was transported to a concentration camp in Asuncion, Paraguay, the victorious
country. After the Wichi man was liberated, he went In search of his family. When
he eventually found them and was recognized, his relatives tried to kill him and
he had to flee. Absent an understanding the concept of the person among the
Wichi, this attempt at homicide makes no sense in an Argentine court. This man
was seen as an ahot, a ghost, by his relatives. The terms ahot and Wichi function
in an unstable, dangerous system for those participating in it. In broad terms the
ahot have as their main task the conversion of Wichi Into ahots. The Wichi, in
turn, try to endure, and remain Wichi. It Is a layered contest between the living
and the dead, which provides a privileged window into essential, pervasive
characters of the Wichi world view.
There is no space here to cite the many other existing examples of "the intimacy
of the law," as It renders Itself invisible to outsiders.. -including cases of shamanic
homicide, polygyny, rape, and the marriage of a Wichi man to the daughter of his
wife by a previous husband. 19 This is a well-known marriage institution among the
Wichi and currently two Wichi men are in jail because they are guilty of incest
according to Argentine law. The point is that, no matter what the national and
provincial codes may say, customary law is more extolled than embraced, its
contents either unknown or alien to the majority of ArgentineS. 20
Three. Ethnography and History

We cannot finish this quick overview without addressing the fiction of a
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"white" Argentina, set aside from a phantom-like population of "Indians," issuing
laws in their defense.
Bernardino Rivadavia, the country's first president and an ardent product and
promoter of the Enlightenment, was noted for his mixed lineage, which included
African ancestors. He was referred to as "Dr. Chocolate" by his enemieS. 21
General Jose de San Martin, Argentina's liberator, was known among the polite
society of Buenos Aires as "el indio." It is believed that his mother was of M'baya
ancestry. 22
The Junta that declared the "United Provinces of the River Plate" independent
from Spain, had its declaration printed in Spanish, Quechua and Guarani.
The historian Maria del Carmen Ferreyra, examining documents in colonial
archives, has found that several prominent families of the Argentine northwest
had two names, a Spanish and an Indian one.
During the many years of civil wars that followed independence from Spain, local
caudillos like Facundo Quiroga counted invisible shamans among the troops that
rode with him into battle. Other caudillos, temporarily down on their luck, took
refuge among the Indian toldos (camps). One of them, General Baigorria,
became a Ranquel chief.
The kinship maps of both "whites" and "Indians" in Argentina are extremely
intricate and revealing. They open up a field of studies that resembles Macondo
more than Buenos Aires. Unfortunately it has not yet attracted the attention of
many scholars.
In the last quarter of the 191h century the group of criollos who were intimate with
this history began to disappear, overwhelmed by repeated waves of massive
European immigration. This has had an effect on the histories that Argentines
have written since, and the way they tend to imagine themselves today.
Vicente Quesada (1830-1913), a lawyer and historian who served as
Argentine ambassador to Washington from 1885 to 1890--and afterwards
wrote a wry, critical book about the US under the pen name of Domingo de
Pantoja--remembered wistfully and with an ethnographer's eye in his
Memoirs of an Old Marf the criollo way of life in the provinces, centuries
in the making and already obliterated by the time he recalled it. He also
described the African neighborhood of Buenos Aires, known as "Barrio del
Tambor" (the Drum Neighborhood) divided by the "nation of origin" of its
inhabitants: Congo, Mozambique, Minas, Mandingas, Manguelas ...
3
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He describes, without using the term "Voodoo," the elaborate protocols of
what obviously were Voodoo rituals performed at the center of the city. All
this was also gone from Buenos Aires by 1910.
Quesada was well aware of the plight of the Indians. Writing about the province
of Jujuy he said: "Indians here are treated with more rancor than the Jews In
Germany ... Where will they go when they are thrown out of their homes, that
represent all their traditions, and those of their ancestors before them? These
hapless peoples have no rights; powerless, they could not shake off with sheer
numbers the illegitimate owners of someone else's lands.''24
The framework of a nation-state, intolerant of particularities, shapes the way we
tend to look at history, excluding much. The most vocal contemporary discourse
on rights also suffers from short memory and from provincialism. Yet we have
seen that some of the most serviceable trails proverbially go back to Rome and
confront us, even in peripheral cases like that of Argentina, with the type of
questions and challenges to interpretation that Marcel Mauss so masterfully laid
before us.
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